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Horizon-Scanning and Identification of 
Emerging Risks among Nanotech 
Companies in Denmark  
Steffen Foss Hansen* and Henrik Vejen Kristensen**  
 
Abstract 
In order to understand how companies identify and handle emerging risks related to 
nanomaterials, we completed more than 15 in-depth interviews with key personnel in various 
Danish companies. Companies varied greatly in regard to number of employees and overall R & D 
capacity and health and safety personnel, but also in regard to level of which, they already 
used/produce products that contain nanomaterials. Surprisingly, very little research has been done 
on: 1) How companies identify emerging risks, 2) Collect and analyze data on these risks, 3) how 
they communication results of their analysis internally and externally, 4) how they complete their 
analysis of management options and subsequently implementation of these management options 
and finally, 5) what the implications of action taken has been.  
Blue-color employees noting “that something might not be right” as well as the media rumors 
turned out to be the two main sources of identification of emerging risks, whereas ad hoc personal 
and non-formal networks and meetings with academics and health care officials also played a role. 
In most cases, various sources were used in obtain more factual information including: Google; 
Newsletters from the National Research Centre for the Working Environment; chemistry databases 
and scientific articles, but the information gathering process itself was somewhat unsystematic and 
seems to be completed ad hoc over time. Internal data analysis was performed by occupational 
health personal within the companies in constant consideration of resources available, priorities, 
possible management options, etc. unless health personal “felt like it” putting far more effort into it. 
Very often independent external experts were consulted in order to learn more and get outside 
confirmation of key internal findings and interpretations of the available literature.  
The selection of management options often involved a pro et con analysis of various options 
considering various technical and operational barriers whereas implementations often followed a 
process of: 1) Double-checking that company is in compliance with existing legislation and 
guidelines - often non-NM specific; 2) Initial mapping of NM R & D within the company; 3) Initiation 
of a capacity building process; 4) Mapping of NM exposure (sometimes very extensive); 5) Mapping 
of health effects among employees (again sometimes very extensive) and 6) Mapping and 
implementation of possible management options. Overall, very few options had been implemented 
about mostly “easy”, “low-hanging fruit” - PE-options and administrative controls. Results were 
mostly communicated internally via intranets or internal workshops with health representatives. 
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Externally communications included publication of scientific papers, posting of information on 
company websites, but surprisingly involve no or very limited dialogue with authorities as this was 
considered irrelevant at best and potentially a source of additional confusion and bureaucracy. 
Overall, implications of action taken within the companies have had little impacts, but in generally 
company representatives noted that they had gotten an improved knowledge about NM risks; that 
there was a general alertness regarding risks related to airborne NPs and – in some companies - 
that there was an increased dialogue between workers and leadership. 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
Identification of an emerging technological risk is a prerequisite for any kind of risk assessment 
and risk management and safe handling. Nanomaterials constitute the one of the most recent case 
of emerging technologies and associated risks. In order to understand how companies identify and 
handle emerging risks related to nanomaterials, we completed 15 in-depth interviews with key 
personnel in various Danish companies. Companies varied greatly in regard to number of 
employees and overall R & D capacity and health and safety personnel, but also in regard to level of 
which, they already used/produce products that contain nanomaterials. 
To the best of our knowledge there is no definition per see on “emerging technological risks”, 
but the term “emerging technologies” has been defined in many ways. Day et al. (2000) suggest that 
emerging technologies are defined as “science-based innovations that have the potential to create a 
new industry or transform an existing one.” Similarly, a publication National Institute on 
Occupational Safety and Health on emerging technologies and the safety and health of working 
people state that “Emerging technologies exist where the knowledge base is expanding, the 
application to existing markets is undergoing innovation, or new markets are being tapped or 
created.” (NIOSH 2006).  
Identification of emerging technologies and materials and their potential risks is a vital first 
element of any proactive strategy on OHS. In some countries, public and/governmental agencies 
already are set up to be on the outlook for and alert to emerging technologies and materials and 
potential risk. For instance, the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in the 
U.K. launched a Horizon Scanning and Futures Programme in 2002, and the government has 
committed itself to the establishment of a Centre of Excellence in Horizon Scanning, which aims in 
part to spot the implications of emerging science and technologies.  In Denmark, potential 
regulatory aspects and risks of emerging technologies such as information and communications 
technologies (ICT), biotechnology and nanotechnology were originally discussed under the heading 
of green innovation. In 2006, the Green foresight project by Jørgensen et al. (2006) reviewed and 
discussed the future environmental challenges and possible environmentally related competitive 
advantages related to nanotechnology, biotechnology and ICT. The Danish Ministry of the 
Environment and the Environmental Protection Agency as part of an environmental innovation 
strategy from 2002-2003 that focuses on green products and materials. Hence it was not focused on 
identifying emerging technological risk per see. 
Often new and emerging technologies and materials are first invented, explored and used in 
R&D labs and production facilities of universities, SMEs and larger companies. Surprisingly, very 
little research has been done on: 1) how companies identify emerging technological risks; 2) Collect 
and analyze data on these risks; 3) how they communication results of their analysis internally and 
externally; 4) how they complete their analysis of management options and subsequently 
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implementation of these management options and finally, 5) what the implications of action taken 
has been.  
 In the following we first provide a description of how we identified the companies that we 
interviewed and how the interviews were completed after which we describe our findings. Finally 
we discuss their implications and provide a number of recommendations. 
2.  Methodology 
In Denmark the industrial uptake of nanomaterials has been driven by users of nanomaterials 
and products based on nanomaterials in sectors like healthcare and cleaning services, auto- and 
transport services, public laboratories polymer composites, insulation and other industrial 
manufacturing plants. To our knowledge, only a limited number of Danish companies actually 
produce nanomaterials. Since much research and risk management guidance today has been focus 
on R&D and productions of nanomaterials, we have included a wide range of user-companies to 
explore the practice, challenges and need of governance support in this latter stage of the value 
chain. With reference to both the ISO and EU definitions of nanomaterials and objects, we have 
included companies using primary nanomaterials, nanostructured materials and companies facing 
challenges with incidental nanomaterials to cover the complex issue of defining and dealing with 
nanomaterial related risks (European Commission 2011).  
Companies were first identified via network and then via use of snowball method i.e. asking the 
first OHS-representatives that we interviewed to suggest 2-3 other potential relevant companies or 
OHS-representatives to interview and then repeating this process until we have talked to most of 
the same names and companies that were mentioned. In-depth interviews with user companies 
were supplemented with interviews with public research laboratories; OHS consultants, union and 
trade representatives and OHS regulative authorities to evaluate the current options for 
governance support and identified the need of support in the governance system as a whole. 
When completing the interviews, we used a qualitative responsive evaluation design (Stake 
1990) in order to build empirical ground for recommendations at the company level and 
governance system level. We did focus group interviews using a semi-structured qualitative 
interview guide when interviewing central OHS and R&D representatives from companies and 
organizations. The guide allowed the respondents to provide an historical account of their work 
related to nanomaterials – from first awareness of risk issues to implementation of policies or/and 
new safety measurements. It also allowed the interviewer to bring examples of challenges and 
solutions for former interviews in the study in for validation and elaboration in new organizational 
contexts.  
3.  Results  
In the following, we will present our findings. In order to support our observations, we include 
selected citations from the OHS-personnel that we interviewed. It should be noted that there might 
be a risk of over interpretation of individual statements when they are taken out of the interview 
context and that these statements were originally made in Danish and hence have been translated 
into English here.  
3.1  Identification of emerging risks 
Blue-color employees noting “that something might not be right” as well as the media rumors 
turned out to be the two main sources of identification of emerging risks, whereas ad hoc personal 
and non-formal networks and meetings with academics and health care officials also played a role.  
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In the case of the company that deals with issues of exposure to incidental nanomaterials from 
combustion processes, the worker union representatives had been alerted sporadically over the 
course of some years in the late 90s: “my wife says that I smell like of work despite just having 
showed”; “there is something in the air”; “I think that there are too many case of cancer in the 
section that I work in”; “…fertility problems…”; ”…high abortion rates…”, “…retired people die too 
early” according to the Union representative that we interviewed.  
Another OHS-representatives from a major R & D university department noted something 
similar for nanomaterials: “lab technicians had been the first to come to her expressing concern 
about the safety of nanomaterials and asked questions”. 
Many OHS-representatives got the initial notion of nanomaterials are an emerging risk through 
the media. For example, one said: “I do not know for how long we have been working with it, but I 
caught my attention through the media.” Similarly, one of the global manufacturing company 
explained that lots of media attention on nanorisk related issues did provide at first source of 
“alerts” along with suppliers using the prefix “nano” in their marketing made OHS-representatives 
eerie to the fact that there might be a risk or an issue that they needed to look into.  
Other ways in which to identify emerging risks that were mentioned were for instance to 1) 
study all safety resumes prepared by the safety sections in the different R & D departments of the 
company and use these actively to identify emerging issues and of course, learn more about them 
and 2) participates actively in workshops and seminars held by national and international research 
projects that tries to includes multi-stakeholder aspects thereby hear and learning about emerging 
risks. 
3.2  Collection of data, information and knowledge 
In most cases, various sources were used in obtain more factual information including: Google; 
Newsletters from the National Research Centre for the Working Environment; chemistry databases 
and scientific articles, but the information gathering process itself was somewhat unsystematic and 
seems to be completed ad hoc over time. One OHS-representative by himself mentioned that: 
“information comes from a diffuse range to sources”. 
Several OHS-representatives from different companies explained that whenever time permits, 
they systematically visits the homepage of the Danish National Research Center for the Working 
Environment, search university libraries, read EU research reports on nanomaterials and use 
Google to search for news related to the issue. Using Google turned out to be key element: “We try 
to figure something out and there is no literature on OHS-issues. We Google.” Only one OHS-
representative that we interviewed said that the OHS-unit had a series of databases that they would 
always use and search for information before using Google to find additional sources of 
information: “We assume that it is as a carcinogen and advise people to work in closed systems. The 
precautionary principle will always prevail. We do not only rely on guidance documents. Is it 
dangerous? Has it been investigated? We google everything on all the substances that we buy, look 
at the toxicological information in the workplace risk assessment, which lies in prolongation of the 
work what we already do on chemicals and we would never trust the information provided by the 
supplier”. Both the two global manufacturers told us that they often asked suppliers to provide the 
safety information that they had access to and that they communicate very clearly to their 
suppliers, what it is that they want and do not want, which the supplier actually seem to appreciate.  
Several interviewees also pointed out that network and access to resource personal was key to 
data collection. As one OHS-representative stated: “Network is gold worth” explaining that they 
draw on past colleagues from a former workplace that now works with the Danish environmental 
protection agency and Danish Industry, respectively. Similar, one said that they relied on a “more 
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diffuse data collection via intellectual networks” e.g. “People meet in different forum and try to 
articulate the issues at hand”. “Personal networks, contact, all kinds of contacts are our sources of 
information”.  
Only two aspects were highlighted by all interviews and the first of these was the importance 
and relevance of the information, newsletter and website provided by the Danish National Research 
Center for the Working Environment: “NRCWE does a lot of really good stuff with summaries of key 
reports, news appetizers and they are extremely helpful and they can always put you in connection 
to someone that know more about it and they are able to explain it in a manner that we 
understand”. 
The second aspect that was highlighted by all interviews was that the Danish Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Danish Working Environment Authority were not very helpful. One OHS-
representative stated that: “You will not get any freaking answer, if you ask them and if you do, it 
will a formal answer, engulfed in legal mumbo-jumbo. The website of the Danish Environmental 
Protection Agency is not very good and it seems as if as you are suppose not to find what you are 
looking for and if you ask them a question that you have thought just a little about, they go 
completely into a deadlock and no one wants to touch it”. Similarly, critique was directed towards 
the Danish Working Environment Authorities: “Taking contact to the authorities, would be like 
“sending a folk of headless chickens that did not know anything into the factory and ask them to 
make decision and it will not be the right decision – they do not know anything more than we do - 
instead we have to trust that the people that work with it and that they will look at the risks”. 
3.3  Analysis of information and knowledge by OHS-personnel 
Internal data analysis was performed by occupational health personal within the companies in 
constant consideration of resources available, priorities, possible management options, etc. unless 
health personal “felt like it” putting far more effort into it. Most often independent external experts 
were consulted in order to learn more and get outside confirmation of key internal findings and 
interpretations of the available literature.  
One of the global manufacturers used a very formalized process to analyse the data collected. 
First, they investigated what happens when the nanomaterials is prepared and compared it with a 
similar product, determined particle release and found no significant difference in all process 
where nanoparticles were generated. An independent toxicologist reviewed all reports prepared 
and the internal company doctor has been very proactive in the regard to initiating this process i.e. 
having reports developed and independent toxicologist evaluated the reports. And the worker 
union actually used the same approach in order to have an outside expert consultant analyse and 
comment on the OHS data published and used this expert in the dialogue with employees.  
3.4  Communication internally and externally 
Results were mostly communicated internally via intranets or internal workshops with health 
representatives. Externally communications included publication of scientific papers, posting of 
information on company websites, but surprisingly involve no or very limited dialogue with 
authorities as this was considered irrelevant at best and potentially a source of additional confusion 
and bureaucracy. 
When asked if they ever contacted the worker health and/or environmental authorities about 
their findings, one OHS-representative answer: “No, no, no, no, we would never communicate 
anything to the Danish Working Environment Authority or the Danish Environmental Protection 
Agency; the general notion is that one should be very careful with sharing anything with the 
authorities and if you do, then you should be prepare on that it can turn out to be a disadvantage for 
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you in the end. They will turn up and investigate you, if you provide them with too much 
information”. “Nobody is interested in the knowledge that you have unless there are problem and 
the problem is that either the Danish Working Environment Authority or the Danish Environmental 
Protection Agency can match our insight when it comes to research, if you have really investigated 
the matter in depth.”  
They had not contact authorities and really did not see the point with doing so: “Why should we 
contact the authorities when we make the dish with milk instead of cream”? Instead, the company 
OHS-representatives had focussed on initiating and sponsoring toxicological studies with the aim of 
publishing it in the scientific journals. The work was going through peer-review at the time of the 
interview, but the company doctor has presented results to internal expert forum and part of the 
results of this work had already been published via poster presentations around the world. This 
was found to be the best way to share results and policies in order to “…be rid of “suspicion” about 
hiding nasty stuff” and the OHS-representatives assumed that it would be “case closed” once the 
articles have been published – “we have done our homework”. 
Despite of quite some effort being done in order to communicate the results externally, internal 
in house communication had been limited, but it had been presented for health and safety officers 
at semi-annual meetings noting that “The safety department knows and determines what is 
specifically relevant for the different health and safety officers at the specific units…” of the 
company. Sales department had been informed about the safety of the final products as customers 
had and/or could potentially ask about the safety about nanomaterials e.g. German news articles 
about concern about “nano” triggered request from German, French and Swiss sales department 
even before the material came into the marked.  
During the design and commissioning of toxicological studies, no communication had been 
attempted internally and externally and no effort is made to make contact to authorities as “where 
is no reason to cause concern”. Interestingly, one OHS-representative told us that they did not see 
any need to have new information sources. Scanning the news in the media, along with receiving 
news letters from different scientific sources, etc. seemed to be good enough a catch emerging risks, 
but underline that “we are in coherent with existing legislation and if there is no legislation, we 
develop our own guidelines but it is hard without Occupational Exposure Limits but when it is low 
values, low values, etc.”. An University OHS-representatives mention sometime along the same lines 
noting that they had a series of standard OHS-sentences and remarks that they insert to the safety 
guidance on a materials if it is on the nanoforms along with recommendations about “If the material 
is available in the bulk form, then buy that if it does not have to be on the nanoform” but noting 
that: “It is hard for us to prepare guidelines as the materials differ so much from each other and 
hence we do not quite how to take that into consideration”. One OHS-representatives from the 
worker union that represent worker exposed to incidental nanomaterials from combustion 
processes mentioned that they deliberately had decided to go via the media in order to get some 
attention draw to the emerging risks.  
3.5  Analysis and implementation of management options 
The analysis, selection and implementation of management options often involved a pro et con 
analysis of various options considering various technical and operational barriers whereas 
implementations often followed a process of: 1) Double-checking that company is in compliance 
with existing legislation and guidelines - often non-NM specific; 2) Initial mapping of NM R & D 
within the company; 3) Initiation of a capacity building process; 4) Mapping of NM exposure 
(sometimes very extensive); 5) Mapping of health effects among employees (again sometimes very 
extensive) and 6) Mapping and implementation of possible management options.  
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 Summarizing this 6-step process that eventually led to the implementation of risk reducing 
measures, the worker union OHS-representative explains: “An operation committee started to 
discuss various issues and they establish a steering group to investigate the problem with exposure 
to incidental nanomaterials and this group initiated the beginning of a smaller research project to 
establish the levels of exposure”. The outcome of the small consultancy project, subsequently lead 
to a bigger independent research project to establish the exposure-level of incidental nanoparticles. 
After the publication of the research report from the larger research project, the focus moved from 
studying the pollution levels to studying the adverse effects of the exposure of incidental 
nanoparticles as well as to what one can reasonably expect in regard to options and demands in 
regard to air pollution. No one wants to set a safe level of ultrafine particles and we still want to 
keep jobs, growth, etc. We have picked the low hanging fruits such as initiating behavioural 
changing campaigns that would reduce levels of ultrafine particles”. 
 One of the global manufacturers similarly stated that no specific measures taken in regard to 
nanomaterials noting that they “measure dust levels in all our factories and they are in compliance 
with all worker safety directives, but we do not measure different parameters such a particle 
number, surface area, etc.”. Still, they had taken an “a number of measures have been taken to limit 
dustiness of their product”. 
 Only a few companies had been through the whole 6-step process. One OHS-representative 
noted that they often stranded on the first step noting: “We constantly create different working 
groups about safety, but it is hard to get people to participate because research is more interesting”. 
Another noted that they use different mechanisms to build capacity within the organization: “We 
arrange theme days about the newest knowledge in the field so that we can all be inspired”.  
 Finally, some go through step 1-5, but fail to complete step 6 on mapping and implementing 
management options: “We took people that worked with nanomaterials with us to workshop on 
health and safety of nanoparticles and that really make people think but as far as I know no health 
and safety guidance initiatives have been implemented and we long for clear guidance on which lab 
condition are sufficient to protect our workers”. 
Overall, very few options had been implemented about mostly “easy”, “low-hanging fruit” - PPE-
options and administrative controls. Limited or no implementation of more thorough process-
related options or engineering controls was identified. Interestingly, we find that if the first alert 
about an emerging risks comes via “bottom-up” requests from students, lab people and workers, it 
seems to led to action being taken by the OHS-personal whereas if the first awareness came via a 
“top-down” approach, it often led to a three-step process of clearly defining of the problem (“e.g. 
our materials is not a nanomaterial”); focus on obtaining more knowledge to confirm safety, and 
finally, close the case.  
Implications of action taken within the companies have had little impacts, but in generally 
company representatives noted that they had gotten an improved knowledge about nanomaterial 
risks; that there was a general alertness regarding risks related to airborne NPs and – in some 
companies - that there was an increased dialogue between workers and leadership. One company 
had the OHS-personnel integrated into the R & D department of the company and argued that this 
had major advantages: “We save them money – e.g. we are 10.000 employees. Assuming that we use 
60.000 pairs of gloves per 24 hours and someone chooses a chemical which has half the penetration 
time compared to the chemical that we used today, - how many time would that be able to pay our 
wages?” Furthermore, “The work that we do save our regional and local OHS-representatives time 
and money. They do not have to be alert to new products all the time because they know where 
they can find information and they know that it has been through a screening process. We 
constantly have to be the link between the production and the R & D department. The OHS-
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department needs to be an integrated part of R & D because if it is not, we would constantly be 
behind the curve”. 
 
4.  Discussion and Recommendations  
The companies that we interviewed varied greatly in regard to number of employees and 
overall R & D capacity and health and safety personnel, but also in regard to level of which, they 
already used/produce products that contain nanomaterials. They also varied greatly in regard to 
how much knowledge they had about nanomaterial risks and it cannot be ruled out that some 
companies might have been willingness to participate in the interviews because they have realized 
that they do not have sufficient knowledge about these risks and that they have used us to discuss 
what their challenges might be and get new knowledge on the subject. 
That said, we find that blue-color employee noting that, “something might not be right” as well 
as the media coverage turned out to be the two main sources of identification of emerging risks, 
whereas ad hoc personal and non-formal networks and meetings with academics and health care 
professionals also played a role. In regard to the initial identification of emerging risks, general and 
continued alertness seems to be the one determining factor. The general alertness does not mean 
that lots of resources have to be set aside, but it does mean that resources have to be available to do 
this as part of the daily established organizational routines. Besides general alertness among OHS-
staff, ad hoc networks and attendance in meetings with academic and health officials has proven to 
be an effective manner in which to identify emerging risks continually as the reoccurring nature of 
such meetings enables OHS-staff to hear and learn about emerging issues that might be relevant for 
them business. Therefore, we recommend that resources be set aside for OHS-staff to nurture ad 
hoc networks and attend OHS-network meetings.  
In most cases, various sources were used in obtain more factual information for risk assessment 
including: Google; Newsletters from the National Research Centre for the Working Environment; 
chemistry databases and scientific articles, but the information gathering process itself is most 
often somewhat unsystematic and seems to be completed ad hoc over time. Overall, the results of 
our interviews shows that OHS-staffers use a number of different sources to identify additional 
information about an emerging risk once it has been identified. Regulators and others that wishes 
to provide information about emerging risks need to be aware of the fact that Google and web-
based research is predominate in most companies. Secondary efforts should into reaching people 
through the newsletters that they normally get e.g. in DK we found that the newsletter from the 
National Research Centre for the Working Environment and branch guidance documents. 
We found that OHS-personnel on a consistent basis did the data analysis internally with due 
consideration of resources available, priorities, possible management options, etc. e.g. “when I feel 
like it”. Hence, it is important to ensure that internal resources are available among OHS personnel 
to explore and go into new and emerging risks as overworked OHS-personnel will be less likely to 
explore new areas of responsibility. 
Results of the data and information collection were mostly communicated internally via 
intranets or internal workshops with OHS- representatives. Externally communications included 
publication of scientific papers, posting of information on company websites, but surprisingly 
involve no or very limited dialogue with authorities as this was considered irrelevant at best and 
potentially a source of additional confusion and bureaucracy. This, we find it a major problem not 
only for the authorities, but also for the companies that work with innovative and emerging 
technologies and in end also for researchers and workers involved in the R &D and manufacturing 
of innovative technologies. Addressing this problem would require that regulatory agencies become 
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a lot more involved in field and that they reach out to companies in order to build trust. From our 
interviews, is it clear that regulators do not have the luxury of not having an opinion on an 
emerging issue such as nanomaterials. As companies do turn to them and often express 
disappointment about their capabilities to assist, they cannot anymore chose not to communicate 
about what is known and not known, what should be done and what initiatives that have been 
taken as this lack of communication creates a innovation deadlock.  
The selection of management options often involved a pro et con analysis of various options 
considering various technical and operational barriers whereas implementations often followed a 
process of: 1) Double-checking that company is in compliance with existing legislation and 
guidelines - often non-NM specific; 2) Initial mapping of NM R & D within the company; 3) Initiation 
of a capacity building process; 4) Mapping of NM exposure (sometimes very extensive); 5) Mapping 
of health effects among employees (again sometimes very extensive) and 6) Mapping and 
implementation of possible management options. The clear-cut focus on compliance could cause 
problems on the longer term, in an area where much new regulation is under way, and stresses the 
importance of national regulatory authorities to communicate about future regulation.  
Overall, implications of action taken within the companies have had little impacts, but in 
generally company representatives noted that they had gotten an improved knowledge about NM 
risks; that there was a general alertness regarding risks related to airborne NPs and – in some 
companies - that there was an increased dialogue between workers and leadership. This might be 
explained by the fact that very few options had been implemented about mostly “easy”, “low-
hanging fruit” - PPE-options and administrative controls. Limited or no implementation of more 
thorough process-related options or engineering controls was identified. The backbone response to 
double-check that the company is in compliance with existing legislation and guidelines is 
unfortunate as most OHS-representatives know very well that the legislation often is non-
nanomaterial specific. But we recommend the authorities use this behavioural tendency to their 
advantage and implement revisions of the statutory order on ‘work with substances and materials’ 
as well as the codes for Measuring Technical Occupational Air Requirement (called MAL-codes in 
Danish) more periodically in the future. Although, the six-step approach seems reasonable, we 
recommend that more focus is put on limiting exposure from the outset and go through the process 
faster – more screening - and commit to implementing management options. Hence, that would 
mean less focus on mapping and more focus on implementing low-hanging fruits as well as more 
focus on exposure limitation and on technical fixes, and finally, the implementation of more 
thorough process-related options/ engineering controls. 
In figure 1 we have summarized the major sources of information and factors that influence 
decision-making and action in relation to handling newly identified nanomaterial risks.  
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Figure 1 
Illustration of the major sources of information and factors that influence decision-
making and action in relation to handling newly identified nanomaterial risks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in figure 1 both internal and external organizational sources and factors influence 
decision-making and the action making. In general, these fall into three overall categories: 1) 
Regulation and risk assessment; 2) Education and counseling; and 3) Public/marked perception 
and media. When and how these sources and factors have a varying influence and role in the 
process from first alert about an emerging technological risk until any action – if any - is eventually 
taken to address this risks. Different search routines provide access to various data and 
information, key persons to contact and resources, which again is affected by OHS-resources 
available as well as the overall business-, R&D- and marketing strategy of the company. It is 
important to stress that most companies are aware of that their current level of knowledge is 
inadequate, and that there might be many blind spots in regard tot the state of the science, best 
practices and regulation. 
 It is almost self-evident that research is needed into the scientific gaps of knowledge, but we 
find that capacity building and education of workers and OHS-personnel is almost equally 
important. Most importantly, however, seems to be that regulators and OHS-authorities provide 
clear communications on 1) the adequacy of existing experiences with handling with volatile 
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organic compounds, fine dust and carcinogenic substances and 2) the adequacy of existing 
engineered controls, PPE and control strategies (like the control hierarchy).  
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